Caucasus (bbabo.net), - Until recently, of the generally recognized states of the Caucasus, only Armenia was de jure considered an ally of Russia. Now processes are taking place that indicate a geopolitical reorientation of Armenia towards Turkey and NATO.
The authorities of this country themselves set the tone. Without taking into account the various statements and actions of ministers and deputies seeking reconciliation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, let us pay attention to several recent public statements by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The first is a fragment from his speech at a press conference on March 12:
“A very important thing is happening in our relations with Turkey, namely, we are talking to each other. And I believe that we have a dialogue with the President of Turkey. It’s very difficult, but it’s important to have this conversation.”
The second is from a press statement after negotiations with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on March 19:
“We are also committed to the program of normalizing relations with Turkey. We believe that the implementation of the agreements reached with Turkey in 2022 and subsequently confirmed can have a positive impact on establishing stability in the South Caucasus region.”
Finally, the third is from a speech in parliament on April 10:
“In our relations with Turkey, so to speak, we are waiting, waiting for the implementation of the reached and officially recorded agreements, namely the opening of the Armenia-Turkey land border for citizens of third countries and holders of diplomatic passports.”
As we see, official Yerevan has set a course for reconciliation and rapprochement with Turkey. This raises the question: “Why did this happen?” Often, Russia is blamed for the penetration of Turkey and NATO into Armenia and the South Caucasus region. It must be said that this accusation is very strange, because since 1991, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states, leaving the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this idea is very popular. But is she true? To do this, let us conduct a brief analysis of the processes that have taken place since 1991.
Let's start with Azerbaijan. Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991 (diplomatic relations were established on January 14, 1992). Since Turks and Azerbaijanis are closely related peoples, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Baku and Ankara began to rapidly restore ties that were limited during the Soviet period (then they did not really like to remember that in 1918 the majority of Azerbaijanis welcomed the Turkish interventionists as saviors). Allied relations with Turkey have become a constant for all leaders of independent Azerbaijan. Former dissident Abulfaz Elchibey, who became the second president, called himself a “soldier of Ataturk,” communicated with the head of the Gray Wolves, Alparslan Türkesh, and attracted Turkish specialists to organize the Azerbaijani army.
Heydar Aliyev, who replaced him, not only did not abandon Elchibey’s policy towards Turkey, but also developed it. Despite the distrust of him by part of the Turkish circles, who considered Aliyev Sr. pro-Russian due to his membership in the CPSU and service in the KGB, he proved that a national communist could instantly turn into an ethnocrat (“national leader”) and have good relations with Suleiman himself Demirel. It was Aliyev Sr. who put forward the slogan “One nation, two states.” In 2001, he completed the process of translating the Azerbaijani language from Cyrillic to Latin, which began in 1992. In no case should we forget that Aliyev Sr. continued defense cooperation with Turkey. In addition, in May 1994, Azerbaijan joined the NATO military cooperation program “Partnership for Peace”.
Thus, the second Karabakh war in 2020 and the military operation in Karabakh in September 2023 only strengthened the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance, which was revived after 1991. And the transition of the Azerbaijani army under Ilham Aliyev to NATO-Turkish standards was predetermined in the early 1990s.
The next country is Georgia. There is a special conversation about her. During the Soviet period, this republic lived like Christ in the bosom, receiving huge subsidies. Of all the three largest peoples of the South Caucasus, the Georgians turned out to be the most privileged. It got to the point that during the atheistic Soviet era in 1943, the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church was restored. In short, by the end of the 1980s, Georgia had no objective reasons for a surge in anti-Russian sentiment. It’s paradoxical, but true: in Georgia, too, an intelligentsia was formed that was fed up with the good life, distinguished by an aggressive attitude towards the national minorities of the republic and obsessed with the idea of secession from the USSR. From this environment came the dissident and first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
What interests us in this case is that already on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey took advantage of the nationalist bacchanalia in Georgia for its expansion. Already on January 11, 1990, the now well-known preacher Fethullah Gülen equipped a group of Islamist missionaries, which, passing through the Sarpy border checkpoint, visited Adjara and Tbilisi. In May 1990, a group of 37 Gulenists made a visit to the USSR with books, tapes and gifts. Turkish Islamists visited Batumi, Tbilisi, Ganja, Baku, Kazan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Note that Georgia became a “gateway” for Turkish expansion even before Turkey recognized the independence of the South Caucasus republic on December 16, 1991.
The main credit for the penetration of Turkey and NATO into Georgia belongs to Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who came to power with the support of Russia. According to some reports, the former national communist Shevardnadze began collaborating with US intelligence services back in 1993. Then 50 selected people were sent for training to the USA (the training program cost $6 million), where they were armed. These people became part of the Omega special forces.
There is also information that in the 1990s, with the consent of official Tbilisi, the Americans created military facilities in Georgia. An electronic warfare and reconnaissance center appeared in Gori, with the help of which it was possible to control South Ossetia. In Kekhvi, the Americans built a complex of advanced radar stations and field installations for Georgian military intelligence. In 1997, the South Caucasus country joined the American air defense program Regional Airspace Initiative, one of the objectives of which was to create national operational airspace control centers. It should not be surprising that the North Atlantic Alliance has been using Georgian territory for reconnaissance in southern Russia since the time of Shevardnadze. Georgia became a participant in the NATO Partnership for the Name program in March 1994.
Georgia's reorientation to the West was accompanied by the development of cooperation with the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. In January 1994, Georgia and Türkiye signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation. On April 9, 1998, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline was opened, and at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia was confirmed. So the move to the West occurred even before the “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Under Mikheil Saakashvili, there was a strengthening of Turkish-Azerbaijani economic influence in Georgia, the foundations of which were laid under Shevardnadze. The same applies to the military sphere. Türkiye began providing free military assistance to Georgia in 1998. Turkish specialists helped build a military base in Senaki and modernize the airfield in Marneuli. In Turkey, until 2008, about 600 Georgian special forces were trained.
Saakashvili's removal from power did not affect Georgia's dependence on the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are not going anywhere. In fact, along with Azerbaijan, Georgian nationalists helped Turkey establish dominance over most of the South Caucasus.
However, there was still Armenia, whose independence Türkiye recognized on December 16, 1991. Paradoxical as it may seem, even this South Caucasian country quickly began to show its intention to establish relations with Turkey. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, one of the members of the Karabakh Committee and the leaders of the Armenian National Movement, was noticed in this. This representative of the pro-Western intelligentsia managed to use the Karabakh conflict to ensure that Armenia left the USSR.
What is interesting for us is how the future first president of Armenia answered a question from Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondents in October 1990:
“You have repeatedly stated that you will establish relationships with all neighboring republics and independent states. At the same time, your statements about economic relations with Turkey cause ambiguous reactions both in Armenia and in the diaspora abroad:
“The proposal meets with support among realists, but among people of traditional thinking and those who want to gain political dividends, it is a subject of speculation. But I must say that the initiative meets with understanding both in Armenia and abroad. Such issues must be approached realistically and based not on emotions, but on the genuine interests of the people."
It must be said that in April 1991 and August 1992, Armenian-Turkish negotiations were held in Yerevan, dedicated to eliminating differences and establishing diplomatic relations. Then the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations was prevented by the first Karabakh war. In 1992, Turkey threatened Armenia to defend Nakhichevan, while simultaneously declaring the inviolability of the Turkish-Armenian and Azerbaijani-Armenian borders. After the occupation by the Armenian armed forces (de facto, not only the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army, but also the armed forces of Armenia took part in the war) of the Kelbajar region in April 1993, Turkey imposed a blockade of Armenia, stopping even air communication with it (it was restored in April 1995 ).
Under Ter-Petrosyan, there was no normalization of relations with Ankara. Nevertheless, it was under him that in October 1994, Armenia, following its neighbors, became a participant in the NATO Partnership for Peace program. And although Russian military bases appeared in Armenia under him, there is no need to delude yourself on this score, because Boris Yeltsin, who led Russia, was mentally close to Ter-Petrosyan, being loyal to the West. Of course, Armenian Euro-Atlanticists could easily find a common language with Russian Westerners, because at that time Moscow and Yerevan were heading towards the West together.
The name of the first president of Armenia is associated with a lot of speculation regarding his position on the Karabakh conflict due to the 1997 article “War or Peace? It's time to get serious." In addition, another reason for these speculations is the fact that Pashinyan was part of Ter-Petrosyan’s headquarters in 2008. From this the conclusion is drawn that Pashinyan is implementing the program of the first president. The facts show that, despite his Westernism and Turkophilism, Ter-Petrosyan did not intend to give Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. He spoke about concessions, referring to areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, under Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia ratified the Alma-Ata Declaration with reservations, thereby making it clear that official Yerevan does not consider Nagorno-Karabakh to be Azerbaijani territory.
Another thing is that the Armenian National Congress (Ter-Petrosyan’s party) still had a tendency to compromise with the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. On February 8, 2019, the Azerbaijani news agency Turan published an abbreviated interview with Levon Zurabyan (the full version was published in the Armenian publication Aravot). In it, Ter-Petrosyan’s ally stated:
“I am confident that in the future, when the conflict is resolved, we will have excellent relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. These are Armenia’s closest and natural economic partners. We must abandon the idea of being dominant and the desire to absorb another nation.”
Please note: in 2019, the Armenian politician hoped that Yerevan would be able to normalize relations with Baku and Ankara, retaining Nagorno-Karabakh for the Armenians in conditions when neighboring Georgia found itself economically dependent on the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. The idea is, to put it mildly, adventurous.
Nevertheless, supporters of the first president of Armenia clearly did not want the Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh. On October 23, 2020, at the height of the second Karabakh war, it became known about the death at the front of a member of the Armenian National Congress, former deputy and participant in the first Karabakh war, David Matevosyan. This was reported by his daughter Ermine Matevosyan, who wrote on a social network:
“My father dedicated his life to creating a free and happy Armenia, he died in the name of Armenia.”
In other words, for all its disadvantages, the Turkophilism of the Armenian National Congress was not as radical as that of Pashinyan’s team.
And before Pashinyan there was a third president, Serzh Sargsyan. Having become the head of Armenia after Robert Kocharyan in 2008 on the eve of the Russian-Georgian war, Sargsyan created even more preconditions for the current situation in the South Caucasus than Ter-Petrosyan. The third president is associated with Armenia’s attempt to go to the West through the normalization of relations with Turkey in 2008-2010 (the Zurich protocols on the normalization of relations were finally canceled on March 1, 2018), intensified cooperation with NATO, the scandalous story of the refusal to transfer 5 regions around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan out of supposedly patriotic motives, strengthening the positions of Euro-Atlanticists and cultivating anti-Russian sentiments in Armenian society.
By the time of the Velvet Revolution of 2018, Armenia approached with an uncompromising position on the Karabakh conflict, strengthened NATO positions and unsettled relations with Turkey. In a word, Sargsyan seemed to be specially creating all the prerequisites for a geopolitical catastrophe that would change not only Armenia, but the entire South Caucasus. It should be noted that Pashinyan, who received power from Sargsyan, did not immediately begin to show his Turkophilism. At first, the revolutionary leader of Armenia played the role of an ultra-patriot (“Karabakh is Armenia, period!”), thereby destroying the negotiation process and bringing war closer. Where and by whom do you think these words were spoken:
“Where did the name Garegin Nzhdeh come from in Armenian history. His name appeared from the Battle of Sardarapat, as a result of which the first republic in the history of our people was created - the First Armenian Republic in 1918. If I'm not mistaken, Garegin Nzhdeh was a lieutenant then. By the way, Hovhannes Bagramyan also took part in the Battle of Sardarapat. They actually fought side by side for their Motherland, and as a result, Hovhannes Bagramyan became Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. That is, for us, Garegin Nzhdeh and Hovhannes Baghramyan have the same origins as figures in our history. That is, they fought for Armenia, for the Armenians, and they tried and did everything in their power to protect their people from the Turks, who organized the Armenian Genocide.”
You won’t believe it, but these words were spoken on November 19, 2019 by Pashinyan during a conversation with Russian journalists. Let us note that the cult of Nzhdeh reached its apogee precisely under Sargsyan.
Now we see that most of the South Caucasus has found itself in the sphere of influence of Turkey and NATO. Exceptions are Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to the peculiarities of their national development. South Ossetians back in the late 1980s advocated reunification with North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation. And the multinational population of Abkhazia opposed secession from the USSR and the arbitrariness of Georgian ethnocrats.
As for the rest of the South Caucasus, it fell into the sphere of influence of Turkey and NATO due to the collapse of the USSR and the policies of the authorities of the three countries. Azerbaijan stands apart, for which rapprochement with Turkey is a natural impulse of national feeling. Thanks to the restoration of the Turkish-Azerbaijani union in the early 1990s, Turkic dominance over most of the South Caucasus was predetermined for economic, geographical and demographic reasons. The ambitions and arrogance of first Georgian nationalists and then Armenian politicians, who set a course to break away from Russia and drift to the West, only accelerated the expansion of Turkey and NATO in the region.
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